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Transformative justice, reparations and transatlantic slavery 
Abstract 
This paper considers lessons recent debates concerning transitional and 
transformative justice, and surrounding transformative reparations, could offer to 
discussions regarding reparations for transatlantic slavery. Even transitional justice 
programmes aiming to provide transformative reparations in the form of development 
programmes (such as healthcare, education and housing provision) have enabled 
governments to avoid addressing structural causes of inequalities. The paper argues 
that calling for reparations for transatlantic slavery in the form of development 
projects is potentially regressive. Framing development programmes as reparations, as 
parts of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Ten Point Plan for reparations do, risks 
presenting these as necessary only because of powerful states’ duty to make amends 
for past wrongdoing. The paper calls for advocates of reparations for transatlantic 
slavery to be more explicit in demarcating the backward- and forward-looking 
foundations of their claims. The importance of symbolic and non-financial reparations 
ought to be more explicitly highlighted as a potential contributor to the social repair of 
transatlantic slavery’s harmful legacies. Moreover, distributive justice should be 
explicitly emphasised as being necessary to realise the present-day and future rights of 
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people suffering from the historical legacy of transatlantic slavery and not simply 
because the present situation is the result of historical injustice. 
 
Keywords: Reparations; transatlantic slavery; transformative justice; Caribbean 




In 2014 the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) proposed a Ten Point Plan for 
reparations to address the legacies of transatlantic slavery (Leigh Day, 2014). These 
claims call for a variety of reparative symbolic, economic and political measures by 
European states that instituted and benefitted from transatlantic slavery. Whilst there 
is much to support with regards to the CARICOM claim and the historical analysis on 
which the claim rests, it is nevertheless imperfect. Significantly, some of the ways the 
calls for reparations have been framed have the unintended consequence of opening 
space for duty-bearing states to attempt to deny their responsibilities in relation to 
addressing ongoing injustices. Drawing particularly on the framework of 
transformative justice and debates over the notion of transformative reparations, the 
paper seeks to engage with some of the limitations and shortcomings of the CARICOM 
claim with a view to identifying ways in which some of these shortcomings might be 
overcome. The paper does this in order to offer a supportive yet provocative critique 
of the reparations claim. It seeks not to minimise or discredit claims for justice for 
historical wrongs but instead hopes to advance the debate about how this can best 
and most effectively be achieved. Furthermore, it is worth noting that whilst the 
arguments and analysis advanced here specifically engage with the CARICOM 
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reparations claim, there are transferable lessons which could equally be applied to 
other calls for reparations for slavery and for colonial wrongs. 
 
First the paper outlines the debates over transformative justice and transformative 
reparations, which are subsequently applied to analysis of the CARICOM claims. 
Second, the historical and political background to the emergence of the CARICOM Ten 
Point Plan is briefly set out. Following this, the Ten Point Plan itself is unpacked and 
critically evaluated with regard to its historical claims, specific recommendations and 
the ways in which these are framed politically. It is argued that the elements of the Ten 
Point Plan which specifically address conditions which are necessarily the result of 
transatlantic slavery are largely unproblematic, whereas the claims which seek to 
address unjust conditions which are contingently linked to transatlantic slavery ought 
to be framed more in terms of the need for contemporary justice than in terms of 
undoing the harms of slavery specifically. The paper concludes that reparations 
movements could strengthen their claims against wealthy and powerful actors by 
adopting a more radical, less limited approach to understanding, explaining and 
framing their claims. 
 
Transformative justice and transformative reparations 
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Transitional justice mechanisms, particularly truth commissions, trials, and (at least 
recommendations for) amnesties, reparations and institutional reform, are increasingly 
mainstream in responses to periods of conflict, widespread atrocities or authoritarian 
rule. Transformative justice, on the other hand, has emerged in recent years as a 
concept responding to and seeking to address some of the identified shortcomings of 
transitional justice (see, for example, Daly, 2002; Gready and Robins, 2014; Evans, 
2016). Broadly, transitional justice processes have tended to focus on individual 
victims and perpetrators of human rights abuses and, especially, on direct violations of 
bodily integrity (through torture, killings and disappearances particularly). These 
amount to addressing a narrow range of civil and political rights issues, whereas a 
focus on socioeconomic rights issues and upon the structural and collective aspects of 
violence and oppression leads to a different conception of victims and perpetrators as 
well as, potentially, different modes of remedy for these harms (see, for example, 
Mamdani, 1996; Gready and Robins, 2014; Evans, 2016). One of the shortcomings of 
transitional justice, though not one much addressed in the research so far produced on 
transformative justice, is the question of how injustices rooted in the deeper past than 
immediate periods of conflict or authoritarianism might be addressed. Major criticisms 
have been levelled at transitional justice mechanisms due to the limitations of being 
(perhaps necessarily) short-term, time bound interventions (Waldorf, 2012; Evans, 
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2016). Questions therefore remain over how those issues which are outside the scope 
of transitional justice might be addressed. How, for instance, should the legacies of 
transatlantic slavery be addressed? Much of the focus of scholarship on transformative 
justice has been upon whether and how the concerns of those affected by conflict and 
injustice, particularly the addressing of socioeconomic rights issues, can be 
incorporated into policies and practices intended to address the legacies of conflict 
and authoritarianism (Gready and Robins, 2014; Evans, 2016). Paul Gready and Simon 
Robins argue that transformative justice is ‘transformative change that emphasizes 
local agency and resources, the prioritization of process rather than preconceived 
outcomes’ and which emphasises ‘the challenging of unequal and intersecting power 
relationships and structures of exclusion at both the local and the global level’ (Gready 
and Robins, 2014: 340). This includes emphasising the social, economic, collective and 
structural aspects of conflict and oppression which has tended to be neglected (or at 
least addressed secondarily) in mainstream conceptions of human rights practice and 
in transitional justice in particular (see, for example, Mamdani, 1996; Stammers, 2009: 
8; Gready and Robins, 2014). A transformative justice approach, or at least elements of 
it, might yield useful lessons for movements seeking to address the legacies of 
transatlantic slavery and other injustices rooted in the deeper past than those which 




A parallel debate to that surrounding the theorisation and application of 
transformative justice concerns reparations specifically. On the one hand, reparations 
are frequently recommended (if not actually delivered) as part of transitional justice 
programmes (Waldorf, 2012). On the other hand, the typical processes of reparations 
programmes and the common forms of reparations, where they have been 
implemented, have been criticised (for an overview see, for example, Moffett, 2015). 
Advocates of transformative reparations argue that narrow conceptions of what 
reparations ought to be (for example financial payments to individuals) or what they 
ought to be for (for example, primarily symbolic) are insufficient. For reparations to be 
meaningful, or at least for them to be meaningfully transformative, there needs to be a 
focus on both the process and outcomes of reparations programmes. Moreover, 
reparations programmes need to consider what the intended recipients want and 
need. Maria Saffon and Rodrigo Uprimny argue that transformative reparations  
‘conceives of reparations not only as a form of corrective justice that seeks to deal 
with the suffering caused by atrocities, but also as an opportunity to effect democratic 
transformation of societies’ and that ‘[t]his transformation fundamentally seeks to 
overcome situations of inequality and exclusion’ (Saffon and Uprimny, 2010: 389). The 
notion of transformative reparations has led to programmes which take this approach 
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including a variety of different policies and practices as reparations beyond individual 
financial payments. Moreover, these are often significantly different in their specific 
components depending upon the local context. These have included the 
implementation of infrastructure projects and social services in areas where 
populations have been most directly affected by conflict (Saffon and Uprimny, 2010; 
Firchow, 2013). However, a major criticism of this approach is that provision of 
development projects to those communities who have a claim to reparations for 
specific injustices allows governments and other duty bearers to absolve themselves of 
the responsibility to assist in the realisation of human rights for all rather than only 
those claiming reparations for specific harms (Firchow, 2013). Whilst advocates of 
transformative reparations have specifically argued that (though related) reparations, 
social policies and humanitarian aid ought to be distinguished (Saffon and Uprimny, 
2010: 390), this is not always sufficiently realised in practice (see, for example, 
Firchow, 2013). It is deeply problematic for development provision to be contingent 
upon the victimhood of the communities intended to benefit from it (Firchow, 2013). 
This criticism is just as valid for more distant reparations claims, such as addressing 
transatlantic slavery, as it is for more recent injustices (Torpey, 2006: 31-49). John 
Torpey argues, for instance, that in focusing on reparations 21st-century ‘efforts  to  
rectify  past  wrongs  have... jostled   with,   and   perhaps   to   some   degree   
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supplanted,   expansive   visions   of   an alternative  human  future  of  the  kind  that  
animated  the  socialist  and  civil  rights movements  of  the  preceding century’ 
(Torpey, 2009: 28). On the one hand ‘reparations help to make the notion of human 
rights seem enforceable’ (Torpey, 2006: 49), whereas on the other, a focus on policies 
and practices supporting specific ‘communities of identity and interest’ can result in 
that specific group’s interests being promoted rather than wider societal 
transformation (Torpey, 2006: 31; see also Bruenig, 2017). 
 
Furthermore, even transformative reparations are frequently conceived as restitutive 
measures, looking to restore the conditions of a past prior to the harms which they 
seek to address (Gready and Robins, 2014: 347). In many cases severe injustices, 
inequality and structural violence were present prior to the specific period reparations 
programmes aim to address. Cognizant of this, attempts to pursue transformative 
justice must look beyond reparations alone, even transformative reparations (Gready 
and Robins, 2014; Evans, 2016). Reparations movements need, therefore, to take 
account of the limitations and contradictions – as well as the potential – present in 
pursuing justice (in part at least) through reparations programmes (Moffett, 2015). In 
the next section debates surrounding reparations for transatlantic slavery specifically 
are outlined. Following this the paper concentrates upon exploring what can be 
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learned through applying lessons which emerge through consideration of 
transformative justice, and the debates surrounding transformative reparations, to the 
movement for reparations for transatlantic slavery. 
 
Transatlantic slavery and reparations 
Reparations claims are motivated by a belief that the problems facing many nations in 
Africa and the Caribbean have their origin in transatlantic slavery. The CARICOM group 
of nations’ claim argues that the profits of the slavery based transatlantic economy 
stimulated British and European economic development, enabling industrialisation and 
colonial expansion. The profits of sugar and slavery therefore enabled vast wealth to 
be accumulated in European nations and contributed to these nations’ privileged 
economic status and their populations’ higher than average living standards to this 
day. In contrast Africa was deprived of labour whilst the profits of enslaved labour in 
the Caribbean enriched European nations. The effects of these relationships, it is 
argued, continue to define economic realities at a global level to this day (Beckles, 
2013; Nunn, 2008).1 
 
The harms of transatlantic slavery were not just economic. Whilst, as Orlando 
Patterson has noted (1982: 176), concepts of race and racial difference were central to 
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slavery in other societies and historical periods to that of transatlantic slavery, the 
institutionalisation of chattel slavery in the Americas contributed to the development 
and entrenchment of modern anti-black racial prejudice and ‘scientific’ theories of 
race (Blaut, 1993: 61-62; Jordan, 1968). Legacies of this racism and the associated 
production of white privilege continue to shape life chances of individuals both within 
and outside of the wider global economic legacies of transatlantic slavery.2 In other 
words, it appears that the racial hierarchies of chattel slavery still influence 
socioeconomic realities both within and between nations which were historically 
engaged in the transatlantic slave trade. 
 
Much evidence exists for the connections between transatlantic slavery and present-
day benefit and harms.3 However, claims for reparations for transatlantic slavery often 
provoke anger and ridicule from those whose nations and communities are asked to 
pay. In the US, the debate about reparations to African Americans has proven to be 
highly divisive. For example ‘When the Mobile Register polled Alabama citizens in the 
summer of 2002, it found the question of reparations was the most racially divisive 
issue it had ever studied. ... Only 5% of white Alabamians support reparations for 
slavery from the federal government, but 67% of black Alabamians support them’ 
(Brophy, 2006: 4). Meanwhile, comments below recent newspaper coverage of calls 
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for Britain to pay reparations, which arose during (then Prime Minister) David 
Cameron’s 2015 visit to Jamaica, included individuals arguing that if Britain has to pay 
reparations for slavery, then France should pay reparations for the 1066 Norman 
Invasion (Muir, Eddo-Lodge and Stanford-Xosei, 2015).4 Such comments are often 
made flippantly but are designed to demonstrate the supposed ridiculousness of 
reparations claims and that the distance of time makes these claims less and less 
meaningful. However, if this argument is engaged with in a serious fashion, it produces 
insights which serve to illustrate both the importance of historical actions to present-
day realities and the significance of transatlantic slavery’s legacies of harm. Firstly, the 
dividing identities of Norman versus Anglo Saxon no longer consciously (or implicitly) 
define socioeconomic relationships within Britain, whereas racial difference does. The 
comparison therefore is, in one sense, facetious and does little to delegitimise the call 
for reparations for slavery. Secondly, and contrastingly, many of the British landed 
gentry trace their possessions to 1066 (Clark, 2010: 3). This is significant for three 
reasons. Firstly, this illustrates how historical events determine the distribution of 
wealth, power and privilege and shows that this distribution can last many 
generations. Secondly, this further highlights how racism is one of the significant 
legacies of transatlantic slavery – perhaps the most significant. Thirdly, this points to 
how transatlantic slavery and its legacies, whilst exceptional, reflect and emerge from 
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wider social and economic structural hierarchies which shape and perpetuate 
inequality and may also need to be addressed if the specific harms of transatlantic 
slavery’s legacies are to be fully overcome. These three points should influence the 
way reparations are considered. It is also worth noting that the specific dynamics and 
politics of reparations vary somewhat between contexts. For instance, in the USA 
reparations for slavery are largely seen as a domestic issue, whereas in the UK debates 
over reparations often focus on international dynamics with regard to relations with 
formerly colonised countries. Further complexity emerges in consideration of other 
political dynamics over reparations claims within and between states, such as the fact 
that France continues to operate as a colonial power in the sense that Martinique is 
legally and politically incorporated into the French state as a Department (an 
anonymous reviewer deserves thanks for inviting consideration of this point). 
Notwithstanding this, the paper continues with a particular focus on the CARICOM 
reparations claim, and argues that the analysis put forward here can nevertheless add 
value to consideration of other calls for reparations for historical injustice. 
 
Reflecting the arguments advanced above, the position of this paper is that there are 
real and important legacies of transatlantic slavery that must be addressed. However, 
this paper also argues that in seeking to tackle social and economic inequality, 
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arguments which emphasise the rights of present-day and future individuals are 
superior to arguments that seek to address present-day harms only as a repair for 
historic injustice. Whilst the specific injustice of transatlantic slavery requires 
acknowledgment and redress, this must be in addition to, rather than instead of, 
addressing current injustices which ultimately have complex roots (including but not 
limited to slavery). For example, whilst the gendered, sexist and patriarchal aspects of 
slavery affect ongoing institutions of patriarchy and gender inequality in post-slavery 
societies this is not the only source of present-day patriarchy, nor did patriarchal 
norms and gender inequity initially emerge solely as parts of systems of slavery (see, 
for example, Beechey, 1979; Walby, 1989). Reparations (even transformative 
reparations) do not address the social and cultural structures that first produced and 
continue to help reproduce racism and related forms of inequality, injustice and 
oppression. On the other hand, symbolic recognition, apologies, education and 
memory work, for instance, do not immediately address persistent economic 
inequalities (regardless of whether they can be traced to slavery). Both need to be 
addressed. 
 
Analysing the CARICOM claims 
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CARICOM is an intergovernmental organisation of Caribbean states comprising fifteen 
member states, plus five associate members (Caribbean Community, n.d.). The 
CARICOM Reparations Commission (CRC) was established following the Thirty-Fourth 
Regular Meeting of Heads of Government of CARICOM in July 2013 (CARICOM 
Reparations Commission, n.d.). The CRC was established after the publication of Hilary 
Beckles’s influential book Britain’s Black Debt: Reparations for Caribbean Slavery and 
Native Genocide (2013), which calls for reparations and documented struggles over 
bringing reparations onto the political agenda at the 2001 UN World Conference 
Against Racism in Durban, South Africa. Beckles serves as the Commission’s chair and 
had previously served as the leader of the Barbados delegation to the 2001 Durban 
conference (Beckles, 2001; CARICOM Reparations Commission, n.d.). The 
establishment of the CRC and the CARICOM reparations claim was in part influenced 
by frustration on the part of representatives of CARICOM member states at the 
perceived lack of progress at the 2001 Durban conference regarding addressing 
Caribbean states’ concerns over the ongoing impact of slavery (Beckles, 2013; 
CARICOM Reparations Commission, n.d.). 
 
To analyse the CARICOM claims in light of the framework outlined above the paper 
now discusses the assertions of CARICOM about the nature of European involvement 
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with the Caribbean in the Ten Point Plan. Two areas are highlighted. First, aspects of 
the CARICOM claims which are unproblematic. Second, elements of the claims which 
could be improved or expanded upon. There are several reasons why improvement is 
possible. Some aspects of the claims lack sufficient historical contextualisation and are 
in danger of homogenising Caribbean and/or European experience. Moreover, aspects 
of the claims frame the need for development and the realisation of socioeconomic 
rights in the Caribbean as required specifically as reparations for transatlantic slavery, 
rather than as necessary (in the Caribbean and elsewhere) due to present conditions 
and future need. 
 
The CRC makes a number of assertions regarding transatlantic slavery and puts 
forward a specific Ten Point Plan for reparations. Both the assertions which form a 
preamble and the plan itself are analysed below with regard to their unproblematic 
aspects and elements which could be improved upon. The CRC argue that European 
states: ‘Were owners and traders of enslaved Africans’; ‘Instructed genocidal actions 
upon indigenous communities’; ‘Created the legal, financial and fiscal policies 
necessary for the enslavement of Africans’; ‘Defined and enforced African 
enslavement and native genocide as in their “national interests”’; ‘Refused 
compensation to the enslaved with the ending of their enslavement’; ‘Compensated 
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slave owners at emancipation for the loss of legal property rights in enslaved Africans’; 
‘Imposed a further one hundred years of racial apartheid upon the emancipated’; 
‘Imposed for another one hundred years policies designed to perpetuate suffering 
upon the emancipated and survivors of genocide’; ‘And have refused to acknowledge 
such crimes or to compensate victims and their descendants’ (Leigh Day, 2014). 
 
To address these harms the Ten Point Plan calls for: 
1. Sincere formal apology. 
2. Repatriation programme. 
3. Indigenous people’s development programme. 
4. Development of museums and cultural institutions in the Caribbean. 
5. Support to address medical legacies of slavery. 
6. Addressing the legacy of illiteracy. 
7. Support to develop networks and relationship between African and Caribbean states 
to learn ancestral heritage, creating ‘knowledge networks and community 
rehabilitation’. 
8. Truth telling and education to address psychological trauma and the ways racism 
has undermined African solidarity. 
9. Development of industry and business to address colonial underdevelopment. 
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10. Debt cancellation (Leigh Day, 2014). 
 
Evaluation of the Ten Point Plan 
The above assertions of the CRC are broadly true. European states did largely destroy 
the indigenous populations of the Caribbean and institute a racially codified and 
prejudiced system of slavery in the Caribbean. European states benefitted financially 
from transatlantic slavery. It helped fund industrialisation and the expansion of 
European colonialism which led to the relative underdevelopment of vast swathes of 
the world. The racial dimensions of transatlantic slavery survived the abolition of 
slavery and continue to define relationships across the Caribbean and wider world. 
However, whilst broadly true, there are gaps in this narrative which have important 
implications for the reparations movement. In particular some aspects of the narrative 
present an oversimplified history (discussed next) and, based on this, some of the 
claims for reparations are framed unnecessarily narrowly. This in turn can reduce the 
advocacy power of the claims. 
 
The historical narrative that underpins reparations claims often lacks historical 
contextualisation. Transatlantic slavery’s harms and impact are well documented but 
by presenting this without contextualisation the relationship between transatlantic 
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slavery and other forms of labour exploitation, social hierarchy and inequality in the 
past and present is obscured. Significantly, this can serve to misrepresent what is 
needed to maximally repair the harms caused by transatlantic slavery. 
 
Transatlantic slavery developed due to the normality of slavery at the time. When the 
first Portuguese purchased enslaved Africans on the coast of Dahomey and exchanged 
them for gold on the Gold Coast they were entering into an already flourishing West 
African coastal slave trade (Thornton, 1992: 111; Smallwood, 2007: 15). That the 
Portuguese would enter into slave trading is also not surprising because slavery was, at 
this time, routinely practiced in the Mediterranean (Davis, 2006: 49). Societies in the 
Americas practised forms of slavery; Native Americans sold captured rivals to 
Europeans and also purchased enslaved Africans from Europeans (Minges, 2004; Bartl, 
1995). The idea that Europeans disrupted a united, harmonious or peaceful Africa, as 
sometimes implied by some of the pan-African sentiments of reparations claims 
(notably points 2, 7 and 8 of the Ten Point Plan) is also potentially misleading. The 
transatlantic slave trade was possible in part because of the absence of a ‘pan-African 
consciousness’ (Davis, 2006: 88). The concept of African was, in many regards a 
European invention imposed from outside and it was in the Americas where the 
enslaved ‘discovered themselves as Africans’ (Northrup, 2002:135). Pan-African 
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consciousness and identity developed in the Americas in response to European racism 
(Sidbury, 2007). 
 
The development of slavery in the Americas also similarly reflected more widespread 
practices in Europe. As David Brion Davis (1975: 489) has observed, Rousseau was 
arguing in the 18th-century that ‘the justifications for slavery were no more absurd 
than the justifications for all forms of privilege and inequality’. The codification of 
chattel slavery in the Americas also built upon cultural and legal precedents from 
Europe  (Beckles, 1998: 227-233; Christopher, 2010). As Robin Blackburn (2011a: 21) 
notes, ‘[t]he Spanish and Portuguese use of African slaves was heavily influenced by 
medieval, Mediterranean and Roman legacies’. Similarly, the development of cruel and 
barbaric punishments in the codification of slavery reflected the use of violence within 
European societies (see, for instance, Navin, 2015). In the early colonial period, the 
development of slavery took place alongside other forms of coerced and unfree labour 
which, whilst less severe than chattel slavery, helped to build the mechanisms for a 
racialised chattel slave system. In this early period indentured white servants and 
enslaved Africans often laboured together and sometimes rebelled together. Free 
blacks were also more numerous than in later periods. As Blackburn (2011a: 61) 
outlines concerning the early 17th-century: ‘[f]or about fifty years the North American 
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tobacco planters purchased white indentured servants from Britain. During this period, 
there were as many free blacks as slaves in North America, and the former briefly 
enjoyed similar rights to white colonists’. However, this situation did not last. 
 
Whilst transatlantic slavery’s origins reflected wider social, political and economic 
relationships, the development of European ‘New World’ colonies saw slavery become 
increasingly marked out from other practices with race being a central means of 
justifying differentiation (Jordan, 1968: 81-98). Racial dimensions to slavery were 
defended firstly through utilising theology and, later, ‘scientific’ theories further 
entrenched racism and the notions of racial hierarchy.5 The abolition of slavery did not 
alter racial prejudice and the racial dimensions of socioeconomic divisions remained.6 
The development and entrenchment of racism within the European mindset marked 
an important development which differentiated chattel slavery in the Americas from 
other historical slave systems. The development of theories of ‘scientific’ racism, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, reinforced the existing prejudices and power structures of the 
societies in which ‘scientific’ racism emerged (Blaut, 1993: 62; see also Blackburn, 
2011a: 21; Drescher, 2012: 85-89). As Ta-Nehisi Coates (2015: 7) succinctly notes: ‘race 
is the child of racism, not the father’. At the turn of the 20th-century, eugenicists 
claimed to be able to identify both ‘inferior’ races and ‘inferior’ or ‘degenerate’ 
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individuals. Eugenicists therefore advocated policies of sterilisation of the poorer and 
‘criminal classes’ of European societies as well as colonisation and genocide of 
supposedly inferior nations and races (Rattansi, 2007: 51-55; Marr, 2009: 22-26). 
 
In briefly sketching out a more contextualised historical narrative the paper aims not 
to diminish the history of chattel slavery in the Americas or of the lasting legacy of 
harm that has resulted from this. Rather, the paper aims to highlight how it is 
impossible to detach transatlantic slavery, and the ideology that enabled it, from wider 
processes and ideologies that have enabled historical oppression, exploitation, 
injustice and inequality. The failure of the emancipation process to overcome the 
preceding harms of slavery is caused by the freedom to which the enslaved were 
delivered. No compensation was provided and no land (as had been the case for white 
indentured servants in earlier years; see, for example, Blackburn 2011a: 61). Landless 
and penniless, former slaves were vulnerable to exploitation by the vagrancy laws, 
debt-bondage systems, and coerced by hunger to often labour for the former slave 
owners. Indeed, the process of apprenticeship in the British Caribbean had deliberately 
sought to facilitate this continuation (Heuman, 2006). Many of the mechanisms used 
to coerce the formerly enslaved into fulfilling the labour rules desired of them 
reflected those utilised to coerce the landless, labouring poor during the process of 
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industrialisation in Britain.7 However, whilst this new reality was similar to the 
situation of free but poor white labour, the racial dynamics of transatlantic slavery 
persisted. 
 
When advocates of reparations for transatlantic slavery fail to fully acknowledge or 
contextualise the links between the history of transatlantic slavery and other forms of 
labour exploitation they can appear to privilege one group of historically 
disadvantaged individuals over another. In many ways this is understandable, indeed 
reasonable, as advocates for reparations are targeting the specific harms of 
transatlantic slavery and transatlantic slavery was exceptional for its barbarity and its 
racial codification. However, if reparations advocates do not also identify other 
structural inequalities and processes which rationalise and defend inequality, then only 
one aspect which perpetuates injustice is targeted. As such, there is a failure to 
identify the full set of parameters which contribute to the present-day harms suffered 
by descendants of enslaved Africans and, as a consequence, a failure to identify a 
process of repair that is able to maximally repair the harms that reparations advocates 
identify.8 This is not to say that the reparations called for are not deserved and 
needed. Rather, this should only be the start for how the legacy of transatlantic 
slavery, and what is needed for repair, is understood and articulated. Furthermore, as 
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will be explained later, it is important that reparations advocates do not 
decontextualise and curtail the harm of transatlantic slavery, and thus the repair 
needed, as this could create the space in which those with historical (and also ability-
based) duty to help address these harms might avoid this duty. 
 
Elements of the CARICOM Ten Point Plan can be seen as being based on too narrow a 
framing. There is a danger, in claiming that some aspects of the plan are required 
solely because they address harms that result (wholly or contingently) from the 
legacies of transatlantic slavery, that this could serve to diminish the duty that also 
exists for these harms to be addressed in order to fulfil the rights that present-day 
(and future) individuals have to be free from suffering gross inequality, poverty, racial 
discrimination and similar harms. In particular, the arguments for debt cancellation, to 
address illiteracy, for an indigenous people’s development programme, support to 
address medical legacies of transatlantic slavery, and the development of industry and 
business, highlight this risk. On the one hand there is good reason to believe that many 
of these present day conditions in the Caribbean are at least in part the result of 
transatlantic slavery. However, this is only contingently so. For instance, transatlantic 
slavery may have influenced the ongoing legacy of illiteracy in the Caribbean. However, 
not all cases or regions affected by illiteracy can be said to be the result of slavery. 
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Slavery is not the reason why illiteracy should be combated in general, even if it is the 
case that, specifically in the Caribbean, slavery is the reason why illiteracy is a 
persistent problem. The particular historic roots of conditions in the Caribbean should, 
nevertheless, be highlighted though (in order to combat the arguments of those who 
would claim high levels of illiteracy in Caribbean nations are the result of the failures of 
post-independence leadership, for instance). 
 
There are two main negative implications of framing the claims which are contingently 
linked to transatlantic slavery as though they are necessarily linked to slavery. First, 
this allows for duty-bearing states to obfuscate and deny their responsibility to assist in 
addressing injustices. This is because the exact influence of specific past wrongs upon 
specific present conditions is difficult to determine. This is frequently cited as a 
difficulty in attempts to delineate who ought to qualify for reparations and as a reason 
why reparations programmes often fall short or are not implemented at all (see, for 
example, de Greiff, 2006: 6-8; see also Waldorf, 2012; Moffett, 2015). This issue is 
even more pronounced in attempts to address wrongs – such as transatlantic slavery – 
rooted in the deeper past than contemporary periods of conflict or atrocities. This is 
not to say that the influence of transatlantic slavery does not exist in present 
conditions in the Caribbean. Indeed, this might even be admitted by the states which 
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benefitted from transatlantic slavery. Apologies are one way this may occur, and these 
have become increasingly common (see, for example, Govier and Verwoerd, 2002; 
Kampf, 2009). Sincere apologies can have an important symbolic impact in 
acknowledging wrongdoing and contributing the building of new, just relationships 
between those divided by historical injustice (Govier and Verwoerd, 2002; Radzick, 
2004). However, Joel Quirk (2015), for instance notes UK prime ministers Tony Blair 
and David Cameron’s (and other politicians’) qualified acknowledgements of slavery’s 
legacies and – deliberate – avoidance of connecting this to present conditions or any 
duty to provide apology or material reparation (see also Cameron, 2015; United States 
Congress, 2009; Egan, 2015). The kinds of qualified acknowledgements Quirk (2015) 
refers to contrast with the demands for sincere formal apologies made by reparations 
movements such as those supporting the CARICOM claim (see Leigh Day, 2014). 
Indeed, the degree to which apologies are accepted by those affected by injustices and 
the extent to which they can be said to be intertwined with reparations depends 
heavily upon the form and content of apologies and whether they are linked to other 
measures of repair, such as material reparation (see, for example, Park, 2000). On their 
own, apologies are unlikely to satisfy the demands of reparations movements. 
Furthermore, it is, at times, very difficult to establish a direct chain of events 
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demonstrating that any specific case of injustice in the present is the result of specific 
actions by states which are put forward as duty bearers. 
 
Second, there is the related danger (as highlighted in the earlier discussion of 
transformative reparations) that in putting these claims forward as required 
specifically due to transatlantic slavery, that present injustices (in the Caribbean or 
elsewhere) which are not or cannot be linked to transatlantic slavery do not need to be 
addressed and/or that rich and powerful states do not have a responsibility to assist in 
addressing them if these harms are not related to their past actions. There is the 
danger, for instance, that the legacy of illiteracy is only addressed in areas where it can 
be demonstrated that this is a result of transatlantic slavery. It should not be the case 
that illiteracy that is not the result of slavery goes unaddressed or that those with the 
capacity to address illiteracy do so only when it can be linked to transatlantic slavery or 
to harm caused by their past actions. 
 
To sum up, this matters for the following reasons. Firstly, by prioritising policies to 
address socioeconomic inequality on the basis of historical causation, powerful and 
wealthy nations can attempt to avoid responsibility to help address contemporary 
problems of socioeconomic inequality and injustice by disputing the historical 
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causation of these harms.9 Furthermore, duty bearing states also point to historical 
cases of good behaviour in order to create a see-saw of historical moral inheritance in 
attempt to nullify their historical misdeeds.10 This contrasts with some leaders of 
formerly colonised nations who have used claims for reparations and a focus on the 
harms of colonialism to delegitimise criticism of poor domestic records on human 
rights and corruption for instance (see, for example, Howard-Hassmann, 2008: 85). 
This is not to say that there is not historical causation and responsibility, but direct 
links can be difficult to prove and powerful states seize upon uncertainty to diminish 
the perceived legitimacy of claims of inherited responsibility. By emphasising the 
historical case for reparations, the claims can, therefore, work to unintentionally 
undermine the actual goal of furthering justice in the present. The historical case 
should be made, but this should be in addition to further strands of argument. 
 
Secondly, by insisting on the historical justification for financial redistribution and 
investment in poverty alleviation and development schemes, instead of basing such 
calls on contemporary need and the innate value of housing, healthcare, education, 
equality and opportunity to present-day and future people, this claim minimises 
eligibility to programmes that seek to deliver these. As Pamina Firchow (2013) has 
observed with regard to present-day Colombia, by framing delivery of basic housing, 
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education and healthcare services as compensation for recent communal victimisation, 
the state has been able to absolve itself of responsibility to facilitate socioeconomic 
rights and development for all. As mentioned above, this is potentially regressive if 
calls for basic rights to be delivered are made not on the basis of need and individual 
worth but on the basis of being a victim of historical wrongdoing or its legacy (Torpey, 
2006: 31-49). Furthermore, there is a danger that in focusing heavily on reparations 
attempting to undo an unjust past that the production of a just future is neglected 
(see, for example, Torpey, 2006). Certainly, as argued above, the specific impacts and 
legacies of transatlantic slavery ought to be recognised and addressed. However, this 
cannot be the main or only justification for pursuing socioeconomic rights and 
development everywhere. Reparations, even transformative reparations, are 
inherently limited to particular victim/beneficiary groups, which requires excluding 
others from eligibility. Given the complex historical and contemporary factors which 
influence present day inequalities and depravation, a focus solely upon transatlantic 
slavery will exclude some who are affected by such inequalities from benefitting from 
reparations. The implications of these issues for practice are explored next. 
 
What does this mean for the reparations movement? 
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Given the arguments advanced above, here it is proposed that reparations are best 
rearticulated in two categories. Firstly, there are those which relate only to 
transatlantic slavery, such as: apology, truth telling, knowledge programmes, and 
museums and cultural institutions with the specific purpose of facilitating these, and 
(related) programmes to develop relationships between African and Caribbean states 
and individuals. These programmes address harms that exist solely because of 
transatlantic slavery and its legacies. In contrast, there are harms, which are 
highlighted as being legacies of transatlantic slavery, that mirror or match harms 
shared by other present-day individuals or groups. These deserve to be addressed not 
simply because of historical causation (which includes, but may not be limited to, 
slavery) but also because of contemporary and future harm. Indeed, the present-day 
and future justice aspects of these harms are, in some ways, a more compelling moral 
argument for redress than addressing historical injustice (Miller, 2007: 146-147; Ivison, 
2008: 522). Basing claims on present-day and future justice prevents the privileging of 
one victimised or disadvantaged group over another (see, for example, Firchow, 2013). 
Therefore, whilst it is important to address historical injustices and their legacies, it is 
important to delineate between those aspects which address historical injustices in 
and of themselves and those which are part of a wider project of addressing present-
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day harms and injustices (regardless of the extent to which historical factors influence 
current conditions). 
 
There is evidence from the practice of transitional justice that help further advance the 
above argument. For example, Luke Moffet (2015) has noted with regard to 
reparations programmes in Peru that the purpose has been to acknowledge historical 
wrongdoing and suffering but not to address structural poverty. This has instead been 
seen as the responsibility of other, more widely focused national policy (Moffet, 2015; 
see also Amighetti and Nuti, 2015: 18-19). Furthermore, these should be addressed 
not only by those with moral historical responsibility but also those with the capacity 
to address these present-day inequalities most effectively (see, for example Amighetti 
and Nuti, 2015: 17; Singer, 1972). These may very well often be the same actors but 
the justification matters (and could be two-fold). This is because in the present there is 
a responsibility on currently powerful actors to address existing present-day 
inequalities that extends beyond those inequalities which exist specifically due to 
historical wrongdoing. Historical responsibility further heightens an already existing 




Historical causation remains important in seeking to understand and remedy current 
injustices. Understanding the role of historical wrongdoing in present-day injustices 
demonstrates that the current reality is the result of past actions and policy, not the 
result of natural causes that reflect the acts and worth of those suffering. Furthermore, 
acknowledging the past’s role in shaping the present illustrates that the current 
situation can be remedied by present actors, policies and practices. Historical context 
also illustrates that these specific historical wrongs and their legacies are tied to other 
factors. Multifaceted international processes produce, reproduce and discursively 
justify the structural violence of (for example) economic inequality, racism and other 
prejudices and forms of oppression (see, for example, Farmer, 2004). Each of these 
combine and interact with the legacies of the past to shape present-day conditions and 
outcomes for groups and individuals. This underlines that seeking to address the 
harmful legacies of transatlantic slavery in a manner that isolates transatlantic 
slavery’s history and legacy from wider contexts will result in a partial and, as a 
consequence, insufficient model of repair. What is more, by isolating legacies of 
transatlantic slavery from wider systems and structures of inequality, prejudice and 
injustice, potential allies may be alienated. There is a case to be made that, if the 
reparations movement is to succeed, it will need to build bridges with other groups, 
organisations and movements concerned with socioeconomic exclusion and injustice 
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(Roman, 2002: 384-385). This is not to say, however, that calls to address the legacies 
of transatlantic slavery ought to be absorbed by or considered indistinguishable from 
wider or related struggles for justice. Rather, distinction can be maintained whilst 
recognising commonalities and overlaps with other causes. 
 
Conclusion 
As this paper has outlined, there is a real and significant legacy of transatlantic slavery 
in the Caribbean. This legacy needs to be acknowledged and addressed. CARICOM’s 
Ten Point Plan calls for many important policies and underlines the extent of the 
lasting harm of transatlantic slavery in the present-day and also the future if these 
harms are not addressed. However, as the discussion above illustrates, the CARICOM 
claim for reparations is articulated imperfectly. Drawing upon the lessons of 
transformative reparations and transformative justice, the following specific 
conclusions can be drawn. First, the complexity of history and context ought to be 
recognised. In particular, differentiation should be made between those claims which 
directly and only address the legacies of slavery and those which are influenced by a 
variety of factors including, but not limited to, slavery. This would reduce the ability of 
duty bearing states to deny their responsibility to act by contesting historical analysis. 
Second, the framing of reparations claims ought to be broadened to emphasise that 
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these specific claims are a facet of wider claims for justice. On the one hand, this opens 
up possibilities for the linking up of disparate movements which share a common focus 
on the need for structural violence and unequal socioeconomic processes and 
outcomes to be addressed. This could aid in undermining the frequent divisiveness of 
calls for reparations relating to transatlantic slavery and periods of colonialism. For 
instance, division might be mitigated (and support for reparations increased) through 
acknowledgement that not all members of groups who collectively benefitted from 
these structures and processes of slavery and colonialism (such as European citizens or 
white people) share the same responsibility for producing and reproducing them, or 
through acknowledgment that some within groups privileged by or benefiting from 
these structures were also, to some extent victims of them. For example, some of the 
opponents to reparations who argue that poor white people were also exploited 
during the period of transatlantic slavery and colonialism and that these white people 
and their descendents are often not equal beneficiaries of the riches gained by the 
elites during this time might be persuaded by recognition of this exploitation and 
inequality, and the ways this links to (racist) structures of colonialism and transatlantic 
slavery. Such broadening of focus does not need to (and should not) say that these 
historical experiences (exploitation of poor white workers and chattel slavery) and 
their legacies are the same or equivalent. Indeed, broadening the focus and 
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acknowledging linkages could serve to demonstrate the exceptionality of transatlantic 
slavery and its legacies, and demonstrate the ways in which colonial exploitation is 
different to class inequality (see, for example, Hogan, 2015; Hogan, 2016; Thompson, 
1966). On the other hand, a wider framing also reduces the possibility of 
transformative programmes privileging one victim group over another. By also 
focusing on the duty to act to address historical and contemporary injustices on the 
duty that arises from the capacity to do so, the ability of powerful states to avoid their 
responsibility is further reduced. Furthermore, the rights and needs of those who do 
not easily fit into a specific, narrow category of victim are also emphasised. 
 
Notes 
1. The arguments of Beckles (2013) reflect those developed by Pan-Africanist 
historians Eric Williams (1944), CLR James (1938) and Walter Rodney (1973), and more 
recently echoed by Joseph Inikori (2002), that the transatlantic slave trade and slave 
based economy stimulated European industrialisation and economic growth whilst 
destabilising and undermining African states and their economic growth. 
2. With regards to the USA this has been detailed in relation to broad economic terms 
by, for example Robinson (2000); Bittker (2003: 12-17); Brophy (2006). Others such as 
Frankenberg and Lee (2002) and Leitzel (2001) have provided insight into how racial 
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discrimination affects schooling and policing in the USA. Similar evidence is highlighted 
with regard to nations such as Britain (for example see Jones and Singer, 2008; Isal and 
Yenoh, 2008; Glenndenning, 2010; Cabinet Office, 2017). Meanwhile, internationally 
the disparity in wealth between Africa and the West is highlighted as evidence by 
those who advocate reparations to Africa (see Howard-Hassman, 2008). 
3. See, for example, the work of University College London’s (UCL’s) Legacies of Slavery 
Project which traces the compensation payments provided by the British government 
for loss of property by the emancipation of enslaved persons and how these payments 
were often invested in industrial projects and helped stimulate the British economy 
during the mid to late 19th-century, or the extensive research that has demonstrated 
the links between transatlantic slavery and racial attitudes and white privilege which 
continue to have gross impacts today (UCL History Department, 2015; Hall et al, 2014). 
Meanwhile, Randall Robinson’s The Debt (2000) offers detailed evidence about how 
the history of slavery, segregation and racial discrimination has left African Americans 
less wealthy to this day and how this undermines their ability to compete in US society. 
4. For example, commenting on the Guardian newspaper article ‘Should Britain Pay 




It is utterly ridiculous to think that the actions of hundreds of years ago should 
be thought relevant today. How far back do you want to go? The Normans? The 
Romans? Greece? 
 
The UK was the first to ban slavery, and not only that, but spent much time and 
money enforcing the stopping of the trade. Any country which thinks the state 
of its economy isn't down to its own actions and endeavours after such a long 
time is delusional. (Guardian Comment is Free, 2015). 
5. See for example, Jordan (1968: 18-37); Davis (2006: 48-76); Blackburn (1997: 64-65, 
314-325); Blaut (1993: 61-62). 
6. In part this reflected the entrenched nature of racism at this time. Many 
abolitionists – whilst opposed to slavery – were still racist, albeit in a more paternalistic 
fashion. This can be seen in the ties between abolitionists and colonialism (see, for 
example, Brown, 2006; Porter, 2001). Abolitionism was also celebrated by Europeans, 
notably the British, as being a testament to their moral – and therefore racial – 
superiority. Again this contributed to the ties between abolitionism and advocacy for 
colonial expansion in Africa (see Blackburn, 2011: 475; Quirk and Richardson, 2009). 
7. The processes by which freed African Americans were coerced into labour, often for 
their former masters – but also for the profit of the state – is explored by Douglas 
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Blackmon in Slavery by Another Name (2008). Gad Heuman (2006) similarly notes how 
apprenticed former slaves and fully freed former slaves complained of similar 
exploitation, exorbitant rates and a lack of access to land. Many of the tools Blackmon 
outlines, including share cropping and vagrancy laws, echo similar policies utilised 
against the landless working poor in England, including Combination Acts, truck 
payments, the workhouse and the sentencing of paupers to labour (Blackmon, 2008).  
Many radical working class politicians and their advocates also recognised such 
parallels, including Karl Marx who viewed the North’s fight against the Confederacy 
and slavery as part of the future revolution of labour against capital (Blackburn, 2011b; 
see, also, Thompson, 1966: 61-63; Davis, 1975: 453-468; Fine and Saad-Filho, 2004: 
23). More recently, these parallels have been further explored by Peter Linebaugh and 
Marcus Rediker (2000) who have explored the connections and synergies of 
exploitation and resistance which shaped the Atlantic World and modern capitalism. 
8. Whilst not wishing to downplay the significance of transatlantic slavery, it is 
important to acknowledge the existence of other historical slave systems, such as the 
trans-Saharan and East African slave trades, which forced millions of Africans into 
slavery in North Africa and the Middle East. These trades arguably had less long-term 
impact (they involved smaller, albeit broadly comparable, numbers of people but 
spread over a longer period of time – potentially reducing the demographic impact in 
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contrast to that of transatlantic slavery). They were nonetheless significant and have 
ties to the transatlantic system (see, for example, Fatunde, 2012; Lovejoy, 2000; Nunn, 
2008). An insistence that the transatlantic slave trade has ‘no parallel in terms of man’s 
in humanity to man’ threatens to downplay other histories of slavery and genocide 
that are not linked to transatlantic slavery, and the right to reparation for these large 
scale atrocities and crimes against humanity, if it is not explained and contextualised 
(Leigh Day, 2014; see also criticism of the ‘Holocaust exceptionalism’ narrative, for 
example, Kansteiner, 2014: 405; Schweber, 2010: 696-702; the context of historic and 
ongoing gender inequity and the prevalence of sexual and gender based violence 
against women and girls may also be worth considering in this context, see, for 
example, Sen, 2001; Ellsberg, 2006; Stöckl et al, 2013; Beechey, 1979; Walby, 1989). 
Presentation of both false dichotomies and false equivalencies should be avoided (on 
the dangers of the ‘Irish slaves’ myth, for instance, see Hogan, 2015; Hogan, 2016; on 
the problems with focusing on ‘modern-day slavery’ see also Quirk, 2015). 
9. At the 2001 UN Conference Against Racism and Xenophobia European nations and 
the US disputed the claims that slavery and colonialism were the causes of present-day 
poverty in Africa and the Caribbean, pointing instead to problems such as corruption 
and issues of, for example, slavery today in order to both undermine and deflect 
arguments about European and American responsibility for the transatlantic slave 
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trade with Africa and the harms that it caused (see, for example Beckles, 2013; 
Howard-Hassmann, 2008: 37). Calling for assistance based upon present-day and 
future need could avoid such attempts at avoidance, and although John Torpey (2006: 
31-49) would suggest that calls for reparations reflect frustration with the failure of the 
international community to deliver on the basis of present-day and future based 
human rights, calling for amelioration of present-day and future inequality and 
suffering on the basis of repairing past harms alone potentially undermines advocacy 
based on human rights more broadly. 
10. A prime example of this is the UK’s emphasis of its history of abolitionism as a tool 
to deflect against claims for reparations. See, for example, then UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron’s speech to the Jamaican Parliament on the 30 September 2015 
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